The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court holds oral arguments in appellate cases during the first week of each month from September to May. Morning Edition Host Joe Mathieu spoke with Northeastern Law Professor and WGBH Legal Analyst Daniel Medwed about recent and upcoming developments at the SJC, including last week’s notable opinion interpreting the “anti-bribery” regulations of Massachusetts state alcohol laws. The transcript below has been edited for clarity.
Joe Mathieu: Before we turn to this week's oral arguments, tell us about any major recent decisions you're looking at by the SJC.
Daniel Medwed: Just last week, the SJC issued a major opinion interpreting the state anti-bribery provisions in the context of the alcohol industry. Here's what happened: There was a big beer distributor in Everett that sprinkled around about $120,000 in kickbacks to 12 Boston-area bars to pay to put their products on tap. Now, paying for product placement is common in a lot of industries. My understanding is if you want your cereal at eye-level in the grocery store, you can pay for it. Not so in the alcohol sector, at least since the days of prohibition. The Massachusetts legislature for decades has been concerned about something known as tied houses: an inextricable link between alcohol distributors and small retailers that can monopolize the industry [and] keep products off the shelves. So now the way it works is that there's a law that bans the use of selective discounts to some retailers and not to others. [There's] also a regulation that bars you from giving money to someone to, in turn, influence consumers to buy a particular brand of alcohol. So the Alcohol Beverages Control Commission here said that the beer distributor from Everett violated this law and this regulation and levied a whopping $2.6 million fine, the largest in its history. The SJC upheld it on appeal.
Mathieu: Well, what about the bars that received the kickbacks? Are they liable?
Medwed: Great question. Initially, yes. The commission levied the fine, or a different fine, on the holding group of these bars — a group called Rebel Restaurants, Inc. — and the lower courts upheld it. But the SJC reversed, and here's why: First, the plain language of that law and regulation did not clearly prohibit the receipt of kickbacks, just purveyors of kickbacks. Second, the court looked at the legislative intent. Originally the goal was to stop powerful alcohol distributors from manipulating the market, dominating small retailers and effectively controlling the flow of alcohol. An interesting case in many respects.
Mathieu: Absolutely. So what are we looking out for this week?
Medwed: Well, the one that caught my eye is on tap on Thursday, pardon the pun: Commonwealth vs. Wentworth. And it concerns the interpretation of a law called the Massachusetts Armed Career Criminal Act. It was passed back in 1998, and it imposes enhanced sentencing penalties for people with a history of violent crimes. The issue is, what counts as a violent crime for purposes of this act? Do you look at the conviction in the abstract and ask if it required violence as an element of the conviction, say assault or robbery? Or do you look at the conviction in context and ask did this person use violence in the particular crime, say a burglary, which might not involve violence every time, did it involve violence here? A very interesting issue of statutory interpretation.
Mathieu: Well, let's get yours. What's a better interpretation?
Medwed: I think the abstract approach is much better. For one thing, it's more consistent with the legislative history. The term "violent crime" often is a term of art in many jurisdictions with a clear meaning. Second, it would be a way of putting defendants on notice going into a case about whether their criminal history will make them eligible under this enhanced penalty regime. We don't want judges at sentencing saying retrospectively, "Hey, you have a record of violent crimes." So I think the abstract approach is better.
